Crs Report for Congress Received through the Crs Web China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles : Policy Issues Updated April 5, 2005

By Kan, Shirley A.

Excerpt
Summary: Congress has long been concerned about whether U.S. policy advances the national interest in reducing the role of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles that could deliver them. Recipients of China’s technology reportedly include Pakistan and countries that the State Department says support terrorism, such as Iran and North Korea. This report discusses the national security problem of China’s role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response, including legislation, since the mid-1990s. This report will be updated as warranted.

Table of Contents
Contents Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 PRC Proliferation Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Nonproliferation Commitments but Continued Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Nuclear Technology Sales to Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Ring Magnets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Other Nuclear Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 A. Q. Khan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Missile Technology Sales to Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 M-11 Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Missile Plants and MRBMs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Nuclear Technology Sales to Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Missile Technology Sales to Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Ballistic Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Chemical Sales to Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 North Korea’s Missile and Nuclear Weapons Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Suspected Supplies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Secret Nuclear Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 PRC Ports and Airspace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Trilateral and Six-Party Talks in Beijing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Missile Technology Sales to Libya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Missile Technology Sales to Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Missile Technology Sales to Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Policy Issues and Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Issues for Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 The PRC Government’s Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Foreign and Defense Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Summits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Counter-Terrorism Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Missile Defense, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Export Control Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Linkage to the Taiwan Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Economic Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Satellite Exports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Sanctions and the “Helms Amendment” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Capital Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Nuclear Cooperation Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 U.S. Import Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .